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FOREWORD

Colombia is the most troubled country in the Western
Hemisphere. Drug criminals, guerrillas, and paramilitary groups
are feeding a spiral of violence that makes “colombianization” a
metaphor for a failing state. This monograph, by Dr. Gabriel
Marcella and Dr. Donald Schulz, addresses the strategic dimensions
of the crisis. It argues that Colombia’s future deeply affects regional
security and U.S. interests. The country’s afflictions are spilling over
its borders, threatening Venezuela, Panama, Ecuador, Brazil, Peru,
Mexico, and the Caribbean. At the same time, Colombia is the origin
of most of the cocaine and heroin entering the United States. The
fear is that, if the situation continues to worsen, the country may
become balkanized, with large areas under the de facto control of
guerrilla and paramilitary regimes based, in large part, on narcoeconomies.
U.S. policy is now at a critical juncture. A decision has been made
to become more engaged in the war against narcotrafficking. Yet, the
question remains: Can counternarcotics be separated from
counterinsurgency? The authors believe that it cannot—that
everything is related to everything else—and that unless the
Colombian and U.S. governments address the problem through the
creation of a coherent, holistic strategy, the situation will become
much worse. In the latter half of their report, they discuss both the
military and nonmilitary components of such a strategy. Among
other things, they contend that restrictions on U.S. police training
and counterinsurgency assistance should be removed or revised in
order to enable the Colombian security forces to halt the momentum
of the insurgents and paramilitaries and give them incentives to
negotiate seriously. They also argue that a respect for human rights
is of strategic importance.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this
monograph as a contribution to the growing national security debate
on this important issue.

LARRY M. WORTZEL
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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COLOMBIA’S THREE WARS:
U.S. STRATEGY AT THE CROSSROADS

The biblical holocaust that has been consuming Colombia for
more than twenty years.
Gabriel García Márquez
Colombian novelist

Introduction.
Gabriel García Márquez’s version of the biblical
holocaust, Colombia’s bloody internal strife, deeply affects
the United States and the regional community of nations.
Colombia is the most troubled country in the Hemisphere.
Law and order have broken down. Drug criminals,
guerrillas, and paramilitary “self-defense” organizations
are feeding a spiral of violence and corruption that makes
“colombianization” a metaphor for a failing state. Every
day, about 10 Colombians are killed in politically related
strife, while 85 percent of the 30,000 annual homicides are
caused by pervasive criminal violence.1 More than 1.3
million people have been displaced by war. To some, the
country appears beyond redemption. Mindful of this
challenge, the U.S. Army War College, on December 10-11,
1998, conducted the international conference “Landpower
and Ambiguous Warfare: The Challenge of Colombia in the
21st Century” to better define the problems and propose
constructive measures to assist this democracy in distress.
Some of this monograph is based on the conference
proceedings.
Colombia’s problems are analyzed within the framework
of U.S. national interests and policy. The authors believe
that current policy, dominated by counternarcotics, is at a
decisive juncture. The complexity and interrelatedness of
Colombia’s three wars and the priority need of
reestablishing governmental authority and control over
1

territory and population now under both narcotrafficker
and insurgent influence argue for a more comprehensive
and visionary response. But a combination of prudence and
timidity, the product of ghosts from the past (counterinsurgency and police training in Latin America), a
programmatic approach driven by scarce resources, and the
fact that Colombia’s three wars are intimidatingly complex,
inhibits American policy.
Colombia also presents to the United States the
strategic dilemma posed by ambiguous warfare: how to
adapt its political, economic, and military instruments to
assist a nation confronted by three interrelated forms of
internal violence that have deep international implications
and whose elimination will take a long time. Indeed,
strategic adaptation of the kind that Colombia demands will
be a challenge for the United States in the 21st century.
Accordingly, greater clarity of purpose is in order as the
United States and Colombia deepen a relationship whose
future is uncertain. The purpose of this essay is to clarify the
issues and generate a responsible dialogue on the strategic
alternatives.
Colombia’s Three Wars.
Colombia is a large country, three times the size of
Montana and slightly less than France, Germany, and Italy
combined. It fronts both the Pacific Ocean and the
Caribbean. Seventy-five percent of its 37 million people live
in urban areas. Population growth in 1997 was 1.9 percent.
Its $89 billion gross domestic product places it in the middle
of the major economies in Latin America, though like most
countries in the region, income distribution is highly
skewed. About 50 percent of its people live in poverty, with
20 percent in absolute poverty. Gross domestic product
growth for the economy averaged 4.1 percent from 1990 to
1997. In a nation of abundant resources and land, 10
percent of the owners possess 90 percent of the cultivable
land.

2

The vast majority of the population occupies the
one-third of the country framed by the Andean vertebrae.
Its large eastern region, where guerrillas and narcotraffickers operate with impunity, is lightly populated and
poorly controlled by the central government. Indeed,
integration of Colombia’s many regions into a coherent
nation-state has been the principal challenge since
independence. It is even more so now. Preston James, the
eminent geographer, has written: “It would be difficult to
conceive of a geographic pattern of internal arrangement
that would appear to make the achievement of political
unity and coherence more difficult than in Colombia.”2 Lack
of government control makes large parts of the country
particularly conducive to narcotrafficking and guerrilla
insurgency.
Today Colombia is being torn apart by three
simultaneous wars: the violence and corruption generated
by drug traffickers, insurgents, and paramilitary
organizations (which in 1998 accounted for more than 70
percent of all political killings). Over 35,000 people have
been killed in these conflicts during the last decade. The
rate of killing in Colombia far exceeds the amount of ethnic
cleansing that went on after the breakup of Yugoslavia.
Both the paramilitaries and the guerrillas take over areas
and displace thousands of people. The nation’s capacity to
deal with this turmoil has been sharply declining, due to the
weakening of most state institutions and the fragmentation
of the social fabric. One scholar, Nazih Richani, refers to
Colombia as a self-perpetuating “war system” that is
practically unbreakable.3 Similarly, Eduardo Pizarro of the
National Autonomous University of Colombia, refers to the
“partial collapse of the state.”
Yet, there is hope. In October 1997, 10 million
Colombians went to the polls for mayoral elections and a
national referendum to reject violence and criminality. In
August 1998 the Andrés Pastrana administration came into
office, with renewed domestic and international legitimacy
and support from the United States and the democratic
3

community of nations. This was something that
Washington had been reluctant to give to the previous
Ernesto Samper government because the president had
received campaign money from drug traffickers.
Washington’s distancing, which included denying him a
visitor’s visa to enter the United States and decertifying
Colombia twice for not meeting Clinton administration
criteria in the fight against drugs, was counterproductive
because it weakened the country’s institutional capacity in
the face of the three wars. The upshot was that the enemies
of democracy were emboldened, and Colombia fell further
into the abyss.
President Pastrana quickly opted to open a peace
process with the guerrillas, which commenced in January
1999. His top priority is to end the 34-year guerrilla war.
Proclaiming that “For peace I risk everything,” he agreed to
the demand of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
Colombianas (FARC) to withdraw all government troops
from an area of 16,000 square miles (the size of Switzerland
and containing 96,000 people) controlled by the insurgents.
The other insurgent group, the Ejército de Liberación
Nacional (ELN), would make a similar demand in February
1999. This recalls a previous peace process between 1989
and 1994, when some 5,300 guerrillas surrendered their
arms and were reintegrated into society. Pastrana’s
controversial measure was seen as a bold stroke to
strengthen the government’s credibility and legitimacy for
the peace negotiations ahead. Some observers, however,
were worried that it would enhance the FARC’s position by
legitimating their de facto control of territory.
In November 1998, the U.S. Congress voted $165 million
in supplemental counternarcotics assistance which, added
to $124 million appropriated earlier, makes Colombia the
third largest recipient of annual U.S. aid in the world. The
following month, Secretary of Defense William Cohen and
his counterpart Minister of Defense Rodrigo Lloreda signed
an agreement in Cartagena for closer cooperation and U.S.
military assistance to help the police and special army units
4

in the effort to eradicate illicit crops and deter the drug
traffickers. In a significant development, Colombia will
form an air mobile army battalion to assist in the
counternarcotics effort.
The Strategic Imperative: Why Colombia Matters.
Defining U.S. national interests in the Western
Hemisphere in the post-Cold War era is doubly challenging.
Gone are preoccupations about the threat to U.S. military
security from the other superpower or its regional
accomplices. The strategic environment is far more complex
and variegated, and the threats are more systemic and long
term. The East-West framework has given way to a more
differentiated and mutually satisfying global agenda, which
stresses the common goals of democratic governance,
judicial reform, free trade, economic modernization, the
fight against terrorism and transnational crime, and
protection of the environment. The Miami Summit of 1994
and the Santiago Summit of 1998 advanced a common
agenda, targeting the year 2005 for the establishment of a
Free Trade Area of the Americas. Similarly, the President’s
1998 National Security Strategy stresses the community of
interests and convergence of values between the United
States and the countries of the Western Hemisphere (except
for Cuba).
Some might argue that defining U.S. national interests
too broadly and inclusively in the post-Cold War is
unsustainable. Such a definition, they argue, would not be
credible to the American people. By so doing, any difficulties
that arise may be seen as threats to U.S. security. But a
narrow definition would obscure the obvious long-term
linkages that exist between the core interests: national
defense, economic well-being, international order, the
promotion of democratic and humanitarian principles, and
protection of the environment. Colombia’s travails do not
affect the military defense of the United States. But they
powerfully influence the balance of values that makes the
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United States a healthy and vibrant society, and the
indispensable power in a global environment fraught with
new threats to international order and human decency.
They also deeply affect the security and well-being of
countries in the region, many of which are far more
vulnerable than the United States. With these caveats in
mind, the authors believe that unless national interests are
broadly defined, the U.S. policy response, however
intelligent and well thought out, will be at best insufficient.
The very weakness of Colombia as a nation-state
threatens international order in the region and the
well-being of any number of countries. Its turmoil spills over
into Venezuela, Panama, Ecuador, Brazil, Peru, the
Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico. The threat takes
different forms in different countries: extra-judicial
killings, paramilitary activity, displaced people fleeing
violence, drug trafficking, money laundering, kidnapping,
illegal arms trafficking; corruption of government officials,
policemen, military, the news media, judges, and other
officers of the court; illegal immigration, ecological damage
(from precursor chemicals and defoliants, oil spills from
sabotaged pipelines, and the cutting of the tropical forest),
and economic distortions caused by quick and unaccounted
movements of capital. This melancholy brew weakens the
societal will to resist the breakdown of order and security.
Indeed, one of the cardinal objectives of the U.S. National
Security Strategy, the strengthening of democracy, is under
assault because of the corrosive influence of drug money.
The Stakes for the United States:
Trade, Investment, and People.
In 1997 Colombia accounted for $11.6 billion in two-way
trade with the United States. The latter provided 47 percent
of the country’s imports and is the top investor, accounting
for 44 percent of foreign direct investment. Colombia is the
fifth largest market for U.S. goods in Latin America, with
400 of the Fortune 500 companies doing business there.4 It
is already the fifth largest supplier of foreign oil, and has the
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potential to play a considerably larger role if it can free itself
from the guerrilla violence that is inhibiting the
development of the industry. Over a million Colombians are
in the ethnic tapestry of the United States, as are some
35,000 Americans who reside and work in Colombia.
The Impact of Drug Trafficking on American
Society.
Seventy percent of the cocaine entering the United
States originates from Colombia, amounting to 300 metric
tons with a street value of $30 billion. In addition, 75
percent of the heroin seized by U.S. authorities on the East
Coast is Colombian. The magnitude of the problem is such
that drug consumption caused 100,000 deaths in the last
decade. There are 13.9 million drug users and 3.6 million
addicts in the United States. The total societal cost is
estimated at $300 billion annually from lost productivity,
crime, policing, incarceration, rehabilitation, insurance and
hospital care.5 A large portion of the U.S. prison population
is accounted for by drug-related crimes. According to the
Department of Justice, seven out of ten people in jail have
been drug users.
Colombia produces 80 percent of the world’s cocaine and
now grows more coca than any other country, having
overtaken Peru and Bolivia. Coca production appears to be
consolidating in Colombia, since production in Peru is down
56 percent since 1995 and in Bolivia 17 percent since 1997.6
According to Thomas J. Umberg and Allison Major from the
Office of National Drug Control Policy, most of the increase
in cultivation in 1998 occurred in areas controlled by
guerrillas. Such evidence confirms the existence of the
narco-guerrilla as well as the narco-paramilitary nexus. As
will be seen later, narcotics now provides a major source of
income for guerrilla military operations. (Incidentally,
Colombia now grows the high-yield Peruvian coca variety.)
The narcos create another distortion also. According to
Gustavo Gallón, Director of the Colombian Commission of
Jurists, an estimated 40 percent of the land within the
7

agricultural frontier of the country is in the hands of
traffickers converted into landowners.7
Democracy and Human Rights.
Colombia is one of the oldest democracies in the
Hemisphere. But it is not a strong participatory democracy
with institutions that effectively mediate conflict and
channel citizen demands to the national government.8 The
Liberal and Conservative parties alternated in the
monopoly of power from 1958 until 1974, each running the
national government for 4 years. This pragmatic
accommodation (the National Front) helped end the
post-1948 La Violencia, but it also closed “political
participation to groups and sectors who did not feel they
were represented” by the two parties.9 From 1985 to 1990,
states former Foreign Minister and presidential candidate
Noemí Sanín, Colombia “experienced 5 years of systematic
elimination of leaders, members and movements of these
trends.” 10 In the 1990 presidential campaign, three
candidates not representing the bipartisan system were
assassinated.
Defective democracy has many manifestations. The
judicial system is weak, despite the fact that Colombia
allocates the second highest percentage (4.62) of the
national budget to the judicial system in Latin America and
probably employs the highest number of judges of any
democracy, 17.1 per 100,000 people (in comparison: the
United States has 2; Spain, 3).11 Corruption permeates the
political culture.12 In this environment, public officials,
including judges, prosecutors, investigators, and lawyers
are widely subjected to the temptations of dishonesty. Some
members of Congress have been so corrupted or intimidated
by the narcotraffickers that they attempt to weaken or
defeat legislation aimed at strengthening the government’s
ability to deal with drug trafficking.
In addition, Colombia is one of the most violent countries
in the world. It is the leader in kidnappings, registering
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1,678 in 1998.13 The antikidnapping police and military
rescued 451 victims in 1998, preventing total ransom
payments of $52.2 million. Among those targeted for
murder are human rights activists, leftists, former
guerrillas who were “reinserted” into society (some 3,000
were murdered from the period 1989 to 1994), and former
public figures. Between 1987 and 1992 there were 77
homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, by far the highest rate
in the world. Prominent victims killed in the last decade
have included:

•

Presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galán

•

Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla

•

Diane Turbay, daughter of former President Julio
César Turbay and director of a major Colombian
televison news show

•

Carlos Pizarro, leader of the M-19 former guerrilla
movement

•

Guillermo Cano, editor of El Espectador newspaper

•

Colonel Jaime Ramírez, first Director of the
Colombian Anti-Narcotics Police

•

Bernardo Jaramillo, of the Patriotic Union, a
movement close to the Communist Party

•

Dozens of judges and prosecutors

•

At least 2,000 labor union members since 1991

In short, the human rights situation is appalling. The
annual U.S. Department of State Human Rights Reports,
which are mostly based on reporting by Colombian
organizations, paint a pessimistic picture.14 For the period
1993-98, the Colombian Commission of Jurists and human
rights groups indicated that security forces, paramilitary
groups, and the guerrillas were involved in political killings
9

(in addition to forced disappearances, and social cleansing
against drug addicts, prostitutes, beggars, transvestites,
and street children) according to the following percentages:
Security Forces

Paramilitary

Guerrillas

1993

54

18

28

1995

16

46

38

1996

18

46

36

1997*

7.5

69

23.5

1998*

2.7 (21)

76 (573)

21.3 (160)

* First nine months. Figures not available for 1994. These statistics
may contain serious imprecisions because it is difficult to separate
political from non-political killing.

In May 1998, the Army’s 20th Military Intelligence Brigade
was disbanded because personnel had been involved in
human rights violations. The State Department also reports
that the paramilitaries engage in active depopulation
measures that force people to move to safer areas. The
Colombian Commission of Jurists estimates that the rate of
impunity for violations by the military, guerrillas, and
paramilitaries is virtually 100 percent.15
The Guerrillas.
The guerrillas number about 20,000 and comprise the
FARC, the ELN (reputed to have 5,000 fighters), and the
much smaller EPL (Popular Liberation Army). They
operate in more than 100 separate “fronts” (upwards of 67
for the FARC, and 35 or so for the ELN) and exercise
significant influence over 50 percent of the nation’s 1,071
municipalities. On the eve of the 1997 election, they
targeted political office holders, candidates, and election
workers as valid military targets.16 Their purpose was to
discourage participatory democracy, destabilize the
country, and delegitimate the government. In the process,
they killed more than 200 candidates and elected officials
and forced more than 2,000 candidates to withdraw. During
the first nine months of 1997, guerrillas committed 23.5
10

percent of all politically motivated killings and more than
50 percent of reported kidnappings.
Founded in the mid-1960s, the Marxist-Leninist FARC
and ELN expanded significantly in the 1980s. The most
important reason for the FARC’s growth was the
development of a stable and lucrative source of financing its
activities—the drug trade—by extracting protection money
from coca growers and the operators of clandestine landing
fields and laboratories, along with kidnapping. The ELN
received new life by extorting money from oil companies
operating the Caño Limón-Coveñas pipeline connecting
Arauca province to the Caribbean. From 1986 to 1997 there
were nearly 79 million barrels of crude oil spilled in pipeline
attacks. Damage and lost revenue were estimated at $1.5
billion, while the oil spills seriously damaged the ecology.
Between 55 to 70 percent of the guerrilla war chest comes
from extortion and protection of drug activities, according to
former Defense Minister Rafael Pardo.17 He argues further
that extortion has changed the nature of the guerrillas,
making them more like large criminal enterprises.
Moreover,
While their leaders and declared political platforms continue
to be superficially revolutionary, their purposes are changing.
From their declared objective in the 1960s, which was the
seizure of national political power by arms, they have evolved
toward less lofty goals: local power for the ELN, coalition
government for the FARC.18

In early 1999, however, the FARC vowed to return to the
battlefield if the peace talks do not bring them to power and
a socialist state.
While their political support has been declining in the
last decade, the insurgents constitute a formidable military
threat. Though they cannot now take power, they have
operational momentum. They can feed the “war system”
and maintain a costly stalemate indefinitely. In 1998, they
displayed their growing military capability. For example, in
early March the FARC decisively defeated troops of the
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army’s elite mobile counterinsurgency brigade at the battle
of El Billar. David Spencer, a respected analyst of the
Colombian Army, called this the most humiliating defeat to
date because, for the first time, the guerrillas had defeated a
large unit in maneuver warfare. The FARC military
strategy appears to be to attack troops and police in remote
and vulnerable positions, a pattern repeated at the brutal
October 1998 attack on the police garrison at Mitú (a target
that had no strategic significance to the FARC other than its
psychological impact), deep in the Amazon Basin near the
Brazilian border. These were serious defeats for the
government, which does not have the forces, intelligence,
and quick reaction mobility to respond across the vast
distances of Colombia.
What cannot yet be determined is whether the guerrillas
are serious about the peace process that began in January
1999. Some observers believe they are not. They argue that
the insurgents have a vested interest in the continuation of
the “war system”: after all, it provides them with an
enormous source of revenue through the protection of coca
growers and drug traffickers, something they would
presumably have to surrender in the event of a peace
settlement. Skeptics also contend that the insurgents are
winning the war, and consequently have no reason to
compromise. If these arguments are correct, negotiations
will be little more than a convenient tactical ploy. They will
provide the rebels with a cloak of legitimacy and enable
them to garner international support while consolidating
control over territories and preparing for the option of
intensifying the fighting in the future.
Current estimates are that neither side can win a
military victory, and there are substantial costs and risks
involved in a prolongation and escalation of the conflict.
Such a scenario could well draw the United States into a
more direct security assistance role for counterinsurgency
(such as equipment and training), much as it was pulled into
the Central American conflicts in the 1980s. If that
happens, the likely result would be a strengthening of the
12

Colombian military and the creation of a hurting stalemate,
where neither side could beat the other. Thus it might be in
the guerrillas’ interest to negotiate now, while they are in a
relatively strong bargaining position, rather than later
when the balance of military power has been redressed. By
the same token, one should not dismiss the factor of fatigue.
The war has been going on for decades. The insurgents are
paying an increasingly heavy price, especially from the
attacks launched by the growing paramilitary
organizations. Finally, it is not really known how much the
FARC and ELN would be hurt from a loss of drug revenues.
Some observers believe their intake is much less than the
Colombian military contends. If they are correct, the rebels
might be willing to come to a peace agreement, particularly
if the government were willing to address some of their
political, social, and economic demands, such as agrarian
reform and rural development.
The Paramilitaries.
Many paramilitaries originated as self-defense organizations because of the need to provide security against the
guerrillas in the absence of law and order. Paramilitaries (of
which the largest group is the Autodefensas Campesinas of
Córdoba and Urabá, the Peasant Self-Defense of Córdoba
and Urabá) now constitute a serious threat to both the rule
of law and the guerrillas, often engaging in tit-for-tat
reprisal strikes, with increasingly brutal consequences for
noncombatants.19 In fact, in this war without quarter, both
the paramilitaries and guerrillas share a disquieting
tendency to consider “legitimate military targets” people
normally defined by the international laws of armed combat
as hors de combat, noncombatants. The paramilitaries
operate locally, regionally, and nationally under various
commands. In 1997-98, they inflicted serious losses on the
guerrillas and sympathizers, especially in the Magdalena
Medio region. Some organizations also derive income from
the drug trade in order to fund operations. The extent of
such involvement is not certain, but it points out the
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complex linkages that drug money can generate between
political-ideological motivation and the need to fund
substantial military operations on the part of both the
guerrillas and the paramilitaries.
During the first 9 months of 1998, the paramilitaries
committed an estimated 76 percent of all politically
motivated extrajudicial killings, according to Colombian
sources cited earlier. Some Colombian authorities, such as
General Fernando Tapias, Commanding General of the
Armed Forces, and General Rosso José Serrano, Director of
the National Police, profess to see no difference between the
paramilitaries and the guerrillas, regarding each as a
threat to state authority. Others, such as some military
commanders, take a live and let live attitude. Some regard
the paramilitaries as allies in the war against the
insurgents. Daniel García-Peña, the chief negotiator in the
Peace Commission under the Samper administration,
states that though it would be “barbaric” to grant political
recognition to them, they must be included in the peace
process via separate negotiations.20 A minority of analysts,
such as David Spencer, go further, regarding them as a
potentially constructive element.21 While criticizing their
human rights violations, they argue that these groups are a
reality that cannot be ignored. They have become a political
force that the government must bring into the peace
process.
The Narco Nexus.
No discussion of Colombia’s accelerating national
disintegration would be complete without an appreciation of
the role of narcotrafficking. Violence and corruption have
always been a problem in Colombia, of course, as has the
weakness of the state—its inability to command an effective
presence—in rural areas. But the narcorevolution of the
1980s served as a catalyst for worsening these afflictions by
channeling new resources (both financial and military) to
old foes and creating new social sectors, which transformed

14

a polarized armed conflict between two sides into one in
which multiple groups and sectors are armed.22
Thus, one of the root causes of paramilitary violence was
a decade-and-a-half investment boom in agricultural lands
by nouveau riche drug traffickers seeking to launder profits,
accumulate wealth, and acquire social standing.
Throughout the 1980s, these traffickers made huge
investments in traditional areas of the Colombian
countryside, largely in cattle ranches in the north and
Atlantic coast regions and the central Magdalena River
valley. There rural elites were abandoning their holdings in
large numbers both because of the extortionary taxation
and violence of the guerrillas and the willingness of the
traffickers to pay in cash for choice but overvalued land. The
upshot was that in the 1980s and early 1990s an estimated
5-6 million hectares fell into the hands of the drug lords.23
This was, in effect, an agrarian counterreform, which
aggravated all of the traditional problems of rural
inequality, land concentration and land poverty, and the
class conflicts that accompany them. To consolidate their
holdings in the face of the threats posed by disgruntled
peasants and revolutionary guerrillas, the narcotraffickers
allied themselves with local political bosses, other large
landowners, and the armed forces. Most important, they
sought to augment security by organizing their own private
paramilitary units, which they used to cleanse their areas of
the insurgents and their supporters. In this, they found a
willing ally in the Colombian Armed Forces which, with
little civilian government oversight, supported and trained
these groups or acquiesced in their formation under the
assumption that the paramilitaries were their natural
allies in the war against the guerrillas. By the time it
became clear that the paramilitaries could pose as great a
threat to the state as the guerrillas, it was too late. The
genie was out of the bottle.24
But the narcorevolution not only fueled paramilitary
violence; it also fueled the insurgencies. Out in the
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colonization zones east of the Andes, the guerrillas were
working closely with the small and medium-sized farmers
who provided the raw coca for processing into cocaine. As
with other businesses in areas under their control, they
imposed revolutionary taxes on the growers, while charging
traffickers fees for the protection of landing strips, crops,
and processing facilities. When the heroin boom of the early
1990s hit, the insurgents benefitted from that also.
Similarly, with the recent shift of coca farming from Peru
and Bolivia to Colombia, the potential for revenue increased
once again. Estimates of the guerrilla revenues from the
drug business go as high as $500-600 million annually.
Table 1 depicts the nature of the guerrilla-narco
relationship via the taxes imposed by the guerrillas.
Nevertheless, the precise nature of the rebels’
relationship with the traffickers remains the subject of
heated debate. The Colombian military has patented the
term “narcoguerrilla” to suggest that the insurgents have
become an international drug mafia. The claim is that the
guerrillas now receive the bulk of their financing from the
drug business. Other observers, however, believe these
charges are exaggerated. Some argue that the military has
a vested interest in magnifying the rebel involvement in
order to lure the United States into expanding its military
involvement. They point out that the guerrillas’ drug
revenues come largely from taxation on the least profitable
sector of the business—farming; that apparently few rebel
units are engaged in the actual cultivation of illegal crops;
and that there is little, if any, involvement in the sale of
these narcotics abroad (which is where most of the profits
come from). Indeed, even some U.S. and Colombian
government estimates suggest that only about 20 percent of
the guerrillas are providing protection for drug processing
facilities and farms. (Then again, illicit crops are not
cultivated everywhere. But wherever the insurgents are
present in drug-producing areas, they take advantage of the
opportunity.) Recent reports that the FARC is still largely
using old and improvised weapons and is increasingly
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relying on forced conscription suggest that it is not as flush
with drug money as is often claimed.25
Beyond this, it seems clear that the relationship between
the FARC and the drug traffickers varies widely in different
parts of the country. At the risk of oversimplification, it
appears that where the guerrillas are strong, the narcos
tend to acquiesce to their demands for taxes and protection
money, rather than try to confront them. In contrast, where
Concept

Quantity

Coca crops production

Col $100,000 monthly per
hectare, U.S. $100

Coca leaf production

Col $1,000 per kilo, U.S. $1

Coca leaf harvesting

Col $500 per kilo, U.S. $.50

Lab security

Col $50,000 per kilo of coca
base, U.S. $50
Col $100,000 per kilo, pure
cocaine, U.S. $100

Clandestine airstrip
control

Col $18,000,000 per flight,
U.S. $18,000

Aircraft security

Col $5,000,000, U.S. $5,000

Chemical riverine
transport

20 percent of shipment value

Poppy crop protection

40 percent of production

Morphine production

Col $4,000,000 per processed
kilo, U.S. $4,000

Poppy harvesting

Col $8,000,000 per processed
kilo, U.S. $8,000

*Source: U.S. Department of State, “Narcotrafficking and Guerrilla
Alliance, Colombia 1997,” www.usia.gov/abtusia/posts/COL/
wwwgng97.gif

Table 1.
Narcotrafficking And Guerrilla Income, 1997*.
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the FARC is weaker, the traffickers are more inclined to
resist, supporting paramilitary forces to attack the
insurgents.26
Finally, it must be noted that the paramilitaries and the
guerrillas are not the only groups with ties to the traffickers.
The latter have penetrated all branches of government,
from the national level to the local. The case of Ernesto
Samper (in which the former president accepted drug
money for his presidential campaign) may be the most
notorious instance, but it should not obscure the fact that
dozens of congressmen have also accepted drug money in
return for providing political protection for the mafias.
Similarly, countless judges have released traffickers
because of bribery or intimidation. Nor have military
officers been exempt from such temptations. And as for the
traffickers’ economic connections, suffice it to say that their
money goes everywhere. The Colombian economy is far
more dependent on narcotrafficking than, for instance,
Mexico’s is.27
None of this suggests that the traffickers control the
political system, any more than they can control the
guerrillas or the paramilitaries (which are hardly
monolithic in their origins or agendas). The wars the
Colombian government waged and won against the
Medellín and Cali cartels suggest the continuing
ambivalent relationship that the traffickers have with all
these political actors. They also suggest the difficulty in
defeating the traffickers. Following the destruction of the
giant cartels, the industry decentralized. Today, more coca
is grown in Colombia than ever before, and at least as much
cocaine, and increasingly heroin, is flowing to the United
States. Which suggests that while mafias and their
henchmen may come and go, the basic problem remains
unresolved.
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International Order and Regional Security.
Colombia’s agony deeply affects other societies, most
notably Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Panama, Mexico,
and the Caribbean. The microstates of the Caribbean are
especially vulnerable. In the words of the West Indian
Commission:
Nothing poses greater threats to the civil society . . . than the
drug problem, and nothing exemplifies the powerlessness of
regional governments more. That is the magnitude of the
damage that drug abuse and trafficking hold for our
community. It is a many-layered danger. At base is the human
destruction implicit in drug addiction; but implicit also is the
corruption of individuals and systems by the sheer enormity of
the inducements of the illegal drug trade in relatively poor
societies. On top of all of this lie the implications for
governance itself—at the hands of both external agencies
engaged in international interdiction, and the drug barons
themselves—the “dons” of the modern Caribbean—who
threaten government from within.28

Neighboring Venezuela has a population of 3 million
Colombians, the vast majority of whom came for jobs, while
others are agents of corruption and violence. According to
retired Venezuelan Air Force General Boris Saavedra, the
FARC operates in an area along 2,100 kilometers of the
border and engages in drug trafficking, kidnapping,
extortion, bribery, contraband, money laundering, cattle
rustling, and auto theft. In addition, guerrillas attack and
harass Venezuelan police and military units.29 Venezuelan
police and military officials have developed extensive
coordination with their Colombian counterparts to deal
with these threats. The binational security agenda includes:
fighting off the insurgents, denying them control of the
border areas, checking continuing actions of drug mafias
associated with them, dealing with the large number of
undocumented immigrants, and mitigating rapidly
progressive environmental degradation.
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Ecuador, a transit country for cocaine, is haven to some
350,000 illegal Colombians. Some contribute to crime, such
as kidnapping members of the business community for
ransom. In 1995, the FARC attacked military and police
units. Ecuadoran officials are concerned that an
intensification of Colombia’s internal wars, coupled with
the failure of the peace process, could create a more serious
threat because the Colombian Army might be forced to
withdraw troops from border control missions.30 The
Putumayo region, which is adjacent to Ecuador, is a FARC
stronghold. Ecuadorean authorities, therefore, also conduct
extensive coordination with their Colombian counterparts.
Brazil shares a long and unpopulated border with
Colombia. On November 1, 1998, 800 FARC guerrillas
attacked the Colombian police garrison of Mitú (population
15,000), the capital of Vaupés state, located some 20 miles
from the Brazilian border. Using homemade missiles
constructed from modified gas cylinders, they killed some
60 policemen and seized the town and airport. 3 1
Government airborne reinforcements were forced to land
inside Brazil, doing so without diplomatic clearance from
the government of Brazil, in order to relieve the garrison
and retake the city. Though there is informal local
coordination between Colombian and Brazilian authorities
on security matters, Brazil recalled its ambassador from
Bogotá for consultations, a relatively timid measure that
did little to secure the vast open spaces of the Amazon
Basin.
This is merely one aspect of the impact on Brazil.
Colombian traffickers are also developing ties with
Brazilian criminal gangs. The brutal and indiscriminate
attack on Mitú, which had stunning psychological impact
nationally and internationally, was preceded by similar
assaults in remote areas where the guerrillas have the
operational advantage. Moreover, the vast unpopulated
Amazon Basin, which is shared with five countries,
facilitates the movement of drugs, contraband, and
guerrillas. These countries have yet to work out a system of
20

bilateral and multilateral cooperation to deal with these
security problems.
On February 7, President Alberto Fujimori of Peru
announced that Peru would shift military forces formerly
deployed along the Ecuadorian Border and build three air
fields along the 1600 kilometers-long border with Colombia
in order to stop the FARC and the drug traffickers from
using the vast open Peruvian territory. Colombian
authorities welcomed this assistance from their neighbor as
an important step that would help remove sanctuaries for
the guerrillas and traffickers. Days earlier in Washington,
Fujimori had publicly criticized the Colombian government
for giving legitimacy to the FARC via concession of the
demilitarized zone and the negotiation process.
Panama’s remote and jungle-covered Darién province is
a case where the government exercises laissez-faire
authority, according to Bertha Ramona Thayer.32 FARC
guerrillas and paramilitaries regularly cross over from the
Chocó-Urabá region, conduct kidnappings, deal in
contraband, and acquire arms and provisions to return to
Colombia. It is doubtful that Panama can restore control
over its eastern province. Drug money from Colombia
deeply affects Panamanian life, from money laundering, to
prostitution, large purchases of goods in the Colón Free
Zone, illicit contributions to political campaigns, and
small-time drug trafficking and associated crime.
Finally, Mexico is experiencing the complex process of
“colombianization.” This is defined by Raúl Benítez
Manaut, of the National Autonomous University of Mexico,
as:
The decisive influence on the economy of the profits made from
cocaine sales, the penetration of the drug cartels in the
political and judicial systems, the creation of a social base of
support for the narcotrafficking, the permanent presence of
armed groups of the left in control of rural areas, and finally
the establishment of alliances between the guerrillas of the
left and the traffickers. In sum, “colombianization” is the loss
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of state sovereignty with respect to the control of territory, the
economy, the social base of support, and the presence of armies
autonomous from the state and with great firepower.33

Mexico is a transit area for Colombian drugs, and there is a
tacit alliance between trafficker organizations of both
countries.
The Reconstruction of Colombia:
A Strategy for Generating Legitimate Power.
Colombia faces an imposing set of challenges. To
paraphrase U.S. Ambassador Myles R. Frechette, some of
these only Colombia can deal with. For others, the United
States and other countries can provide advice, specialized
training, some of the material means, and international
political support. But only Colombians can achieve the
political will to make the necessary commitments,
sacrifices, and reforms. The will to win is simply not
exportable. A coherent national strategy is essential, one
that establishes continuity and has broad political support.
Strategy is the calculated relationship between ends and
means. The ends are political objectives which are achieved
by the intelligent application of programs and resources.
Ends must be prioritized, synchronized, and articulated to
the nation. The objectives of a national strategy for
Colombia are formidable: reassert control over national
territory, end the violence and corruption, and build an
effective democracy.
Any strategy must establish legitimate and responsible
governmental authority over territory and population.
Legitimacy is defined as belief by the governed that the
government has the right to govern. It is achieved through
participatory elections and then sustained by effective
governance. It is defended, when necessary, through the
state’s monopoly of force, but always ethically and in
constrained manner. Colombia’s very divisions are at the
root of the failure to achieve a national consensus on
strategy. What Colombia must do is daunting: it is nothing
22

less than the reconstruction of the nation. To do this, it must
generate sufficient legitimate power and apply it effectively
to establish public security, deter the criminality, and bring
the guerrillas to the peace table for serious negotiations to
end the fighting and rebuild the nation.
When societies reach rock bottom during internal war,
there often emerges a general realization that commitments
and sacrifices must be made. In recent years, Nicaragua,
Argentina, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Peru have been
through this process. At some point, the decisional elites
develop the will to mobilize the ministries of government
and generate the popular support to take on the challenges.
At times, the armed forces have taken the leadership in this,
though this is not the best way to proceed.
Caesar Sereseres, a leading authority on the lessons
gleaned from internal wars, suggests that the experiences of
other countries contain important lessons for Colombia.34
Basing his argument on the experiences of Central America,
Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines, he notes that
successful cases possess similar strategic and operational
characteristics:

•

Civil authority took control and, in every case, the
government went to war by mobilizing itself, not just
the military;

•

Counterinsurgency was not cheap; vast resources in
people, money, equipment, and time were required;

•

The military was reformed and restructured; in every
case the army was reorganized; institutional reforms
were critical, and in each case special operations
forces were the cutting edge of the military effort;

•

A national campaign plan was developed, with a
strategy to separate the guerrillas from the
population, defend the infrastructure, and attrit the
insurgents;
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•

For the end game, what happens on the battlefield
matters. If the army is not successful on the
battlefield, it will affect the final result. In every case,
the guerrillas had an end game. In most cases where
the government defined that game in purely military
terms, the government lost.

But Colombia is no ordinary country. There are few
analogies to its three simultaneous wars, the level of
corruption, institutional weaknesses, and to its formidable
geography. Its insurgents, paramilitaries, and drug
traffickers generate their own resources; there are few
external supporters; geographic enclaves within the
country afford the guerrillas and paramilitaries practical
autonomy; and the United States exercises less leverage on
the strategic balance and the government than it did in, say,
Central America. Clearly, these problems must be resolved
through the integrated application of all the instruments of
national power. While military power is essential, it is not
sufficient. Indeed, militarizing the effort may be a good
indicator of continued failure.
Most of the policy relevant academic research on
comparative lessons that might apply to Colombia have
more to do with discrete parts, such as how to win the
counterinsurgency, how to conduct peace negotiations with
internal power contenders, and the reform of the military
and the judicial system. There is little academic writing on
how nations can be reconstructed after they begin falling
apart (such as Colombia) or have failed altogether. An
exception is the work of I. William Zartman. He maintains
that the keys to reconstituting legitimate government and
authority are: power, participation, resources, external
assistance, and leadership.35
Colombia is nowhere near the failed state syndrome, but
the five variables shed light on the task ahead. With respect
to power, the 200,000 plus armed forces and police are duly
constituted. Their task is to restore public security and
governmental presence and control in the national
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territory. It must include institutionalized participation by
broad sectors of society, including constructive engagement
by civil society, in order to legitimize the political system
being restored. Resources need to be made available for
reconstruction, to pay for the implementation of reforms, for
the expanding personnel costs, for the expensive
counterinsurgency, and the gamut of nation-building
activities that reach the citizenry in order to restore
confidence in the legitimacy of the government.
But power, participation, resources, and external
assistance are irrelevant without the catalyst of leadership.
It takes leadership to mobilize the finite resources, people,
ministries, and organizations to sustain the effort for the
long term. Zartman sums up the challenge:
Power, participation, resources are the ingredients behind
this leadership process; unfortunately, there is no order of
priority among them to prescribe. Elementary security must
be restored, most basically through ceasefire; the national
reconciliation must be begun, through informal negotiations
and institutionalizing fora; resources must be secured and
mobilized. . . . All of this must be done at once and at the same
time, and the steps kept apace of each other as the process
moves along. It must also be done with an end in view, as a
process that combines order, legitimacy, and authority with
policy, production, and extraction, rather than a series of
discrete steps taken one . . . at a time. In addition, it must be
done looking backward as well as forward, preparing the
introduction of mechanisms that will prevent the new efforts
from falling back. . . . It must be done with a keen sense of
indigenous . . . ways of doing things, which can be the strongest
allies of reconstruction efforts. . . . state restoration is an uphill
challenge, not an automatic process. . . . It takes time. . . .36

The United States and Colombia:
Ambiguous Warfare and Strategic Dilemmas.
Uncertain of domestic support and skeptical about the
Colombian government’s capabilities and intentions,
American officials are clearly anxious to draw limits on U.S.
support and involvement. The country’s ambiguous warfare
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is exceedingly complex and difficult to understand. Though
there seems to be more consensus in Washington on the
threat, there are differences on the solutions, and whether
the priority focus should be the counternarcotics effort, the
counterinsurgency, or both simultaneously. Thus, it is not
surprising that Phil Chicola, the State Department’s
Director of Andean Affairs, recently affirmed: “We are
committed to maintaining a line between counternarcotics
and counterinsurgency.”37 Similarly, Defense Secretary
Cohen told his Colombian counterpart Rodrigo Lloreda that
U.S. policy is driven by “self interest.” In the same vein,
Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics
Matters and Legal Affairs R. Rand Beers stated that the
“current consensus is to support a counternarcotics effort
first.”38 Defense Minister Lloreda concurred that Colombia
needs no help with the counterinsurgency.
According to Beers, the goals of U.S. counternarcotics
policy are:

•

Enhancement of the Government of Colombia’s
intelligence capability;

•

Eradication of coca, amapola, and heroin, and
development of alternative crops;

•

Interdiction;

•

Strengthening Colombian law enforcement agencies
and the administration of justice.

Beers added that the policy represented a consensus within
the U.S. Government that would be placed at risk if the
United States were to attempt a counterinsurgency role.
Chicola stated that the policy is one of enhanced
engagement, with counternarcotics as the centerpiece,
supplemented by support for the peace process with the
insurgents, human rights, humanitarian relief and
assistance, support for economic reforms, investments, and
environmental concerns.
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The credibility of the U.S. counternarcotics strategy
depends on how it balances the effort to reduce supply in the
countries of origin with the reduction of demand at home.
Because it is the major consumer of illegal drugs, the United
States accepts co-responsibility for the problem.
Accordingly, the 1999 National Drug Control Strategy (and
its annual predecessors) provides a comprehensive
approach to stem domestic use, such as: greater public
education, reducing the number of addicts, drug testing,
treatment of prisoners, and securing the borders of the
United States against drugs. Of course, demand reduction
is a long-term generational effort.
There is agreement between Bogotá and official
Washington that the primary threat is drugs, though some
analysts believe that the guerrillas are the greater danger.
Yet, the guerrillas challenge, if not supplant, governmental
legitimacy, authority, and presence in large sections of the
countryside. In short, the guerrillas feed on the
government’s military and institutional debilities to sustain
war for the long term. Unless Colombia brings the
insurgents to a negotiated end of the war, it may sink into
the abyss of civil war. President Pastrana apparently
believes that the guerrillas are a potential ally in the war
against the narcos. On January 5, 1999, he stated that the
“first enemy of peace is narcotrafficking. If the FARC takes
the decision to eradicate drug crops, they’ll do it. Because
they definitely have the influence to carry it out.”39 He
added, however: “First they must denarcotize themselves.”
This is part of the rationale for the peace negotiations that
were scheduled to begin January 7, 1999. The United
States, it should be reiterated, is encouraging the peace
process. At the same time, one must question whether the
FARC is truly the champion of the people’s cause if they
continue to contribute to the downfall of Colombia via
toleration and protection of the drug traffickers and their
infrastructure of corruption and violence.
The trouble is that American reticence to get more
deeply involved is well-founded. It is based on long
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experience of providing assistance to friendly governments
beset with internal war, fueled in part by high levels of
corruption. El Salvador, a relative success story for U.S.
policy and with no combat assistance from U.S. military
forces, fought the insurgents to a negotiated peace. But it
had a steep strategic learning curve. With American
prodding and cajoling and the prudent application of
significant leverage, El Salvador mobilized some political
will and augmented its institutional capacities.
Importantly, it made necessary fundamental political,
economic, and social reforms, restructured its armed forces,
and changed its military strategy to deal with the
insurgents. Ultimately it went to the negotiating table at
the very twilight of the Cold War, when the SovietCuban-Sandinista support system came to an end.
But the learning process was messy and never linear,
often involving considerable backsliding on the part of the
ally in the field, notably in the area of human rights and the
constrained use of force. Twelve years of strategic and
operational learning were required before El Salvador’s
military and police forces could sway the tide against the
guerrilla Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, a
period which led to a huge human and material toll on the
Salvadoran people but which, in the end, forced the
guerrillas to agree to peace talks which ultimately
succeeded. But El Salvador did not face the awesome
menace of drug money feeding corruption, violence, and the
guerrillas.
Thus, American caution on Colombia is understandable
and prudent. The Colombian government has stated that it
does not want U.S. counterinsurgency support. What
Colombia needs, just like El Salvador did, is effective
pressure to restructure and retrain its armed forces.
Nonetheless, counternarcotics aid is a significant
commitment that comes close to crossing the
counterinsurgency line. The United States may have to
cross the line, not with troops in active combat, but with
training and equipment support for the military and police.
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It may also be necessary for the most compelling reasons: to
allow the Colombian government to be successful in
combating the guerrillas and drug traffickers, regain
control of its national territory, and thus end human rights
abuses, including those committed by the armed forces, the
guerrillas, and the paramilitaries.
Under these circumstances, the United States and
Congress will expect Colombians to make the sacrifices
required to succeed, and they will not support an unjust or
unwinnable war. But how are we to determine justness in
this kind of ambiguous warfare? Americans do so on the
basis of the legitimacy granted to the government through
democratic elections, and the rejection of illegal means in
the use of force, whether on the part of the insurgents, the
paramilitaries, or rogues in the military. Support will also
be premised on the expectation that the government of
Colombia will engage in a serious effort at winning and at
national reconstruction. Accordingly, it must apply its
legitimate authority and power effectively to regain
territorial control and literally win “the hearts and minds of
the people.” While many Colombian leaders recognize this
need, the institutional and societal commitment has yet to
be made. It may be that society will have to reach a higher
threshold of pain before decisive action is taken.
Recovering the Legitimate Use of Force:
Clausewitz and Colombia.
The Commanding General of the Colombian Armed
Forces, Fernando Tapias, asserted: “Unless the state
recovers the legitimate use of force the country could well
sink into civil war.”40 The legitimate authority to have
recourse to force should reside in the state. The insurgents
and paramilitaries advance the principle that might makes
right. Moreover, they conduct violence that negates the
principles of just war by targeting noncombatants and by
using means proscribed by international humanitarian law.
The legitimate authority of the state to use the monopoly of
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force has to be restored, but it must be done ethically and
morally.
Three of Clausewitz’s principles are especially useful for
Colombia’s strategic purposes: the center of gravity,
knowing what kind of war you are engaged in, and the
“remarkable trinity” of the people, armed forces, and
government. The center of gravity for the government is its
legitimacy: regaining the support of the people. The
Colombian Army probably has been involved in more
counterinsurgency warfare than any army in the world, but
the fact remains that it has not been able to defeat the FARC
and ELN and is currently performing badly. It will require
extraordinary effort to wear down the guerrillas because
counterinsurgency is indeed expensive in terms of time,
resources, political endurance, and individual and
institutional sacrifices.
At 146,300 troops, the armed forces may not be large
enough, given the size and terrain of the national
territory.41 Conventional wisdom holds that a successful
counter- insurgency requires a ratio of 10 soldiers to 1
guerrilla, though this is seldom achieved in the real world.
Currently, only about 30,000 of Colombia’s troops are being
used for active military operations against the guerrillas.
Even if the army were to achieve the 10 to 1 force ratio, it
might still not be enough to “saturate” the country, to use
the words of former Defense Minister Rafael Pardo. Unless
effectively trained, organized, and deployed, it might simply
create more lucrative targets for the guerrillas.42 The low
ratio can be somewhat compensated for by the use of force
multipliers, such as greater mobility and better
intelligence. However, in the fall of 1998 the military
utilized only 20 helicopters, though it had access to over 100
more. In contrast, El Salvador had 60 helicopters and
60,000 troops in a territory 1/50 the size of Colombia. The
military needs major improvements in intelligence
collection, evaluation, and dissemination; close quarters
combat, small unit operations, logistics administration and
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support, lift capabilities, leadership training, civil and
humanitarian operations, and human rights.
However tentatively, Colombia and the United States
are deepening their relationship. Yet, it is uncertain how far
this can go. The United States must communicate forcefully
to the Colombians that they must make fundamental
changes based on proven principles for this kind of
ambiguous warfare. This includes: respect for human rights
and justice; adapting the army to aggressive small unit
operations by enhancing intelligence, mobility and quick
reaction capabilities; and improved relations with the
civilian population. Such professional training is available
from U.S. Army Special Forces, as well as those of the Navy
and Air Force.43 The difficulties of getting such training
through the U.S. political process would diminish if the
Colombian government and the public security forces
demonstrated that they can win the wars while respecting
human rights.
These institutional improvements must be accompanied
by careful cultivation of Clausewitz’s “remarkable trinity.”
To be successful in war, the government, military, and
people must have a trinitarian relationship of mutual
support and cooperation. This relationship is the essence of
the American military tradition. It originates from
principles of democratic civil-military relations and civilian
control of the military that were written into the
Constitution by the founding fathers. Trinitarian strategy
dominates the American approach to planning for war.
The absence of such a relationship is another indicator of
Colombia’s debility. Commenting on the weakness of
civil-military relations, the respected former presidential
candidate and Central Bank board member, María
Mercedes Cuellar, commented that Colombia’s institutions
operate as isolated “castes” hermetically sealed from each
other in defending their unique institutional interests.44
Regarding military service, for example, high school
graduates (some 35,000 bachilleres serving in the military)
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are exempted from serving in combat units. (Shades of
college deferments during America’s debacle with a “class
war” in Vietnam.) Moreover, one can buy freedom from
military service. Thus, peasant soldiers fight against
peasant guerrillas, while the middle and upper classes are
spared the nastiness of war. Clearly, the sacrifices for using
the armed power of the state to fight the traffickers,
paramilitaries, and insurgents need to be borne more
equitably. Until all sectors of society share the burden of
war, they are likely to undervalue their stake in the end
game. It will take time—perhaps even a generation—to
inculcate such changes. But unless these commitments and
fundamental reforms are made, the three wars will
continue indefinitely.
Difficult as it sounds, the war must be humanized. This
does not mean putting down weapons, however. Rather, it is
the creation of a more professional military force,
restructured and retrained, which would be able to take the
offensive against guerrillas on the battlefield, thus giving
them an incentive to negotiate seriously at the bargaining
table. But turning the military institution around takes
time, an asset that is diminishing for the government.
Nonetheless, the outcome could be more humane in the form
of limiting casualties, respecting the human rights of both
combatants and noncombatants, and bringing the conflict
to an earlier (rather than later) conclusion.45 The United
States has a lot of experience in teaching its military forces
and those of other nations how to fight according to the
humane considerations of the laws of armed conflict. It must
help train Colombian forces in order to inculcate these
values in their operations. This would be a powerful link for
justifying to the American public and Congress appropriate
levels of security assistance, which might be forthcoming
only if Colombia wages war through just means (jus in
bello). Along these same lines, the United States also needs
to jettison its outmoded prohibition of police training
assistance to Latin America.46 Imparting the best of
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American investigative and policing techniques can be a
powerful force multiplier for democracy.
Returning to General Tapias’s formulation, Colombia
has the choice of generating legitimate power in order to
pursue peace and reconciliation or attempting to impose
order through the use of illegitimate power. The latter
course may bring about civil war, while the former enhances
the chances for peace. The broad alternatives are
summarized below:
GENERATING STATE POWER
Legitimate

Illegitimate

Inclusive democratic governance

Exclusive or “facade”
democracy

Respect for human rights

Human rights violations

Accountability and impartial justice

Injustice and impunity

Civilian control of the military

Lack of control

Rules of engagement controlled by
president as commander-in-chief

Autonomous and illegal
operations

Constrained use of force

Arbitrary and
disproportionate use

Respect for humanitarian considerations in military operation

Massacres, extrajudicial
abuse and killings

Discrimination between combatants
and noncombatants

Indiscriminate attacks

Effective public information program
at home and abroad

Secretiveness and
incompetence

Agrarian reform and rural
development

Abandonment of peasants
and rural areas

Colombian national effort

Dependence on external aid

Burdensharing by all sectors of
society

Sacrifices made only by
poor

The fact that the Army will establish an air mobile
counternarcotics battalion is a critical step forward for two
reasons. First, it shows greater commitment by the
government to pursue drug trafficking. Second, by linking
the unit’s establishment with U.S. counternarcotics
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assistance, it promises to create a new model of military
professionalism that will have to adhere to U.S. human
rights law in order to receive U.S. support. (The Leahy
Amendment to the 1996 international affairs budget
proscribes assistance to: “Any unit . . . if the Secretary of
State has credible evidence to believe such unit has
committed gross violations of human rights unless the
Secretary determines and reports to the Committee on
Appropriations that the Government of such country is
taking steps to bring the responsible members of the
security forces unit to justice.”) It remains to be seen how
this new battalion will operate with the police, what its
mission will be, how it will be subordinated to command and
control, and what its rules of engagement will be, and,
ultimately, if it will make a difference. Nonetheless, the
training and experience of an operationally effective
counternarcotics battalion may have a positive professionalizing impact on the military while strengthening the
support to the police if Colombia is to avoid becoming a
“failed state,” at war with itself and the region.
Colombia must also reconstruct its battered judicial
system, where a mere 3 percent of those indicted are
currently convicted. The issue of land distribution, a potent
source of peasant discontent and fertile ground for guerrilla
recruiting, must also be addressed. Here a promising tactic
would be redistributing land now in the hands of
narcotraffickers to peasants. This can also be a source of
bargaining leverage in the peace negotiations with the
insurgents, in addition to alternative crops, rural
infrastructure projects, and marketing schemes. In sum,
Colombia must maintain the moral high ground of
legitimacy in order to win the support of its own people, as
well as of the United States and other nations (especially
the Europeans). But it should not continue to make the
mistake of putting its armed forces and police out front
without an effective national strategy that engages the
efforts of all the ministries of government and all classes in
society. The Pastrana administration is committed to peace
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negotiations with the guerrillas. Through reforms and
improved institutional capabilities, combined with superior
professional performance on the battlefield, it can create a
more promising environment for peace negotiations.
The Peace Negotiations Process.
On January 7, 1999, President Pastrana made good on
his promise to begin peace negotiations with the FARC. On
that day he met with guerrilla leaders (except the
68-year-old Manuel Marulanda, “Tirofijo") in San Vicente
del Caguán, in the demilitarized zone (despeje). Peace
negotiations are fundamental for national reconciliation
and further legitimize the reconstruction of state power.
The first round of meetings was intended to test whether the
political climate was conducive for putting substantive
issues on the agenda. The process may take years before it
yields positive results.
For the peace process to be successful, it needs to be
accomplished by Colombians, who can take advantage of the
advice, experiences, and support of other nations. It must
include insurgents as well as the paramilitaries. (Whether
the latter can be brought in as a formally recognized
political force or will have to remain as unofficial
participants will have to be worked out during the
negotiations.) The armed forces must also be given an
important role. To fortify the legitimacy of the judicial
system, the issue of impunity must be faced head on. There
can be no impunity for the drug traffickers. The issue of
legal impunity for the insurgents and paramilitaries, both
of whom have much blood on their hands, is a more complex
question. Complete justice in a deeply torn society is
impossible to achieve, and is potentially too divisive for the
future of democracy. Numerous recent experiences around
the globe, from Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, El Salvador,
Nicaragua, Guatemala, Haiti, and South Africa to the
reunification of West and East Germany, point to various
forms of compromise for the greater good of a peaceful
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future. Establishing a democratic community requires a
determination of how far to go in punishing the guilty. The
experience of other nations indicates that the healing
process takes time. Thus, it will be imperative for
Colombians to strike a balance between what constitutes
sufficient punishment for the guilty and the need to move on
to reconstruct the nation.
The FARC, as well as the ELN, claim to have an agenda
for social justice at the negotiating table, including agrarian
reform, income redistribution (in Colombia, the top 5
percent earn more than 30 times that earned by the bottom
5 percent), an end to fumigation intended to eradicate coca
plants, and economic development aid for neglected areas of
the country. 47 They also want security for their people once
they put down their arms, fearing that unarmed they will be
killed, as happened to former members of the M-19. They
may also want political power, but would have to compete
for it within the bounded uncertainty of democracy. In
exchange, they would help get rid of drug trafficking. The
United States supports the peace negotiations and hopes
that if they develop a momentum of their own, they will
eventually persuade enough fighters now outside the
political process to reinsert themselves as productive
members of society. The United States also insists that the
FARC cut the umbilical cord to the drug business,
something that would appear hard to do given the lucrative
income the guerrillas receive from it. Indeed, the insurgents
may be so corrupted by their involvement in the “war
system” as to be unwilling to pursue the best agenda for the
Colombian people: peace, democracy, and justice. If
democracy and justice were truly to come about, the
guerrillas would cease to exist. Military power rather than
ideology appears to be the basis of their influence and
continued existence.48
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Conclusion.
Colombia and the United States are at a strategic
crossroads. The directions they take will help determine
whether the principles of democracy and human decency
survive in Colombia, and whether this major threat to
regional security thrives and infects other societies with
corruption and violence. This essay has set forth
frameworks and strategic directions that should inform the
debate on what is to be done. The responsibility lies with the
people of Colombia to reconstruct their nation. The United
States, the crucial outside actor, has indispensable
experience, resources and political clout. The judicious
application of principles that have worked in the past in
other settings, including legitimate power, democratic
participation, the commitment and resources of the
populace, focused and restrained external assistance, and
creative and sustained leadership, are the keys. There can
be no turning back if Colombia is to avoid becoming a “failed
state,” at war with itself and the region.
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